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Going Toe to Toe: President Barak's and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's Theories of
Judicial Activism
By AMOS N. GUIORA* AND ERIN M. PAGE**
I. Introduction
A critical component of a liberal democracy's counterterrorism
efforts is the role of that nation's judiciary. The concept of an unfettered
executive, unrestrained by courts and legislatures alike, is detrimental to a
nation attempting to balance national security and individual rights.
It is undisputed that a government's executive branch would prefer to
conduct its business without judicial "interference." What separates liberal
democracies from dictatorships, however, is the accountability of the
executive for its decisions. This article will analyze whether, and how, the
courts in the United States and Israel truly review executive decisions
regarding armed conflict.
In examining the role of the judiciary in these two countries, it is
necessary to understand that different political regimes have differing
systems. Nevertheless, there is a common thread to this article: an
examination of the willingness of a judiciary to actively review and, if need
be, criticize and intervene in the decisions and actions of the executive.
Amos Guiora is a Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security, Law and
Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He served for 19 years in the
Israel Defense Forces, held senior command positions in the Judge Advocate General's
Corps including Legal Advisor to the Gaza Strip, Judge Advocate for the Navy and Home
Front Commands, and Commander IDF School of Military Law. In this last capacity, he
had command responsibility for the development of an eleven-point interactive video
teaching IDF soldiers and commanders a code of conduct based on international law, Israeli
law, and the IDF ethical code. He would like to thank his father, Professor Alexander Z.
Guiora, for suggesting that this article be written.
*. Erin Page is a Research Fellow in Terrorism and Homeland Security, Institute for Global
Security, Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; J.D. expected
May, 2006.
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The article analyzes decisions of the two Supreme Courts and writings
of the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist,' and the President of the Israeli Supreme Court, President
Aharon Barak. It is suggested, as a point of reference, that the judicial
activism advocated both intellectually and in practice by President Barak
represents one end of the judicial review scale while the approach of the
late Chief Justice Rehnquist represents, if not the extreme other end, an
opposite approach.
President Barak has propounded and implemented judicial activism in
his decisions over the past fifteen years. Important for our purposes are
Barak's opinions relevant to Israel's counterterrorism efforts. Although the
American experience regarding judicial intervention in the executive
branch's counterterrorism efforts is more recent than Israel's, 2 the issue of
judicial review of executive wartime decisions is not. An attempt will be
made to "superimpose" the latter on the former, while examining recent
decisions including Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 and Rasul v. Bush.4
The proper role of the judiciary in its government's counterterrorism
efforts is a subject that elicits much debate and little consensus. Some
propose that the executive be allowed to make critical command decisions




1. Role of the Court
President Barak's seminal article in the Harvard Law Review, 5 written
while sitting as President of the Israeli Supreme Court, is a compelling
discussion of judicial activism in armed conflict. It presents the theory of
advocating active judicial review against the background of Israel's
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist died September 3, 2005, while still sitting as the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
2. The American perspective on judicial review of counterterrorism efforts is recent,
as it reflects the American response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. Prior to that time,
the United States had faced only one known act of international terrorism on its soil (the
World Trade Center bombing in 1993).
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
4. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
5. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 Harv. L. Rev. 16 (2002).
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ongoing struggle with Palestinian terrorism. The article is crucial to a
discussion of judicial activism in that it clearly and strongly articulates
ideas regarding what role the judiciary should play in times of terrorism.
President Barak's article sends a lucid message to the executive that the
judiciary will be watching, monitoring, and if need be, intervening in
executive decisions pertaining to armed conflict.
In his article, President Barak discusses the challenges that terrorism
presents for democratic countries, arguing that not every effective means of
counterterrorism is legal.6 The Israeli Supreme Court's holding in Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel exemplifies this
as the Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ), 7 held that even
though violent interrogation of a suspected terrorist may save human lives,
it is illegal.8 While terrorists adhere to no rules, "a democracy must fight
with one hand tied behind its back." 9  Even though a democracy has to
fight in this manner, President Barak argues that it still has the upper hand
since it preserves the rule of law and respects individual liberties. President
Barak argues that these two factors strengthen democracies in fighting
terrorism. 10 A democracy is not unlimited or unencumbered in its fight to
protect both the territory of the nation and its citizens. Terrorists abide by
no rules and regulations. It is precisely such rules that separate liberal
democracies from terrorists. Protecting democracy from "the means the
state wants to use to fight terrorism""1 is necessary in order to preserve
democracy. If a state resorts to illegal means to fight terrorism or
disregards its own rule of law, then terrorism has won. A democracy that
compromises its values and standards in order to fight terrorists allows the
terrorists to undermine the very core of the democracy. Laws are most
important in times of war. They were created and developed "precisely so
that they will be consulted and obeyed, not ignored" during times of
crisis.
12
According to President Barak, there is a basic tension between the
6. Id. at 157.
7. See ISR. CONST. art. 15(c) (the High Court is to act as a court of first instance);
According to a 1968 legal opinion, Palestinians or those acting on their behalf, may petition
the High Court against any action the executive (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israel
Defense Forces) intends to take or has taken that potentially harms a Palestinian.
8. Barak, supra note 5, at 157 (Referring to H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against
Torture in Isr. v. State of Isr., 43(4) P.D. 817, but erroneously referring to it as H.C.
4054/95, Pub. Comm 'n Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov 't of Israel, 43(4) P.D. 817).
9. Id. at 148.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 149.
12. Id. at 151.
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components of democracy. Citizens, through their elected representatives,
may expect the government to take all steps necessary in fighting terrorism,
regardless of their effect on human rights. 3 However, the human rights
component of democracy "may encourage protecting the rights of every
individual, including the terrorists, even at the cost of undermining the fight
against terrorism."' 14 Therefore, the executive of a democracy, according to
President Barak, must balance between these fundamentally competing
interests so as to protect the rule of law, which is the essence of democracy.
Barak wrote that "[t]errorism does not justify the neglect of accepted legal
norms."15
Both the executive and the legislative branches of a democracy are
directly responsive to the desires and needs of the public. 16 However,
justices are the ultimate protectors of democracy. 17 Actions taken by the
executive and the legislature must be able to withstand judicial scrutiny.
Justices are not accountable to the public; they enjoy an independence that
the executive and legislature do not.18 This independence and lack of
public accountability allows justices to do what is necessary to uphold
democracy, even when citizens and the State are willing to sacrifice
individual rights. The role of the court is to "ensure the constitutionality
and legality of the fight," 19 regardless of whether the decisions of the court
are popular with the executive or the public.
The role of a justice in protecting democracy and individual human
rights is "a much more formidable duty in times of war and terrorism than
in times of peace and security. ' 20 It is during times of war and terrorism
that citizens often think it permissible to compromise rights and protections
in order to help maintain security. Justices cannot allow themselves to
compromise citizens' rights, regardless of whether it is a time of war or
peace. Justices cannot have different procedures or standards for wartime
21
without eroding peacetime protections as well. Judicial decisions during
times of crisis "remain with the democracy when the threat of terrorism
passes . . . entrenched in the case law of the court as a magnet for the
13. Id. at 148.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 151.
16. Id. at 148.
17. Id. at 149.
18. Id. at 150.
19. Id. at 160.
20. Id. at 149.
21. Id.
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development of new and problematic laws., 22 It is much easier for the
executive to change directions or policy, or for the legislature to revoke,
amend, or pass new laws to amend existing legislation, than for the
judiciary to reverse itself. Mistakes made by the judiciary live on even
after they have been overruled. The logic, reasoning, and basis for a
decision are recorded in judicial history to be used in the future for other
cases, whereas overturned executive or legislative actions are generally
ignored.23
2. President Barak's Theory
President Barak argues that the Israeli Supreme Court's willingness to
review executive actions is not improper interference.24 He sees a crucial
distinction between intervening in military considerations and intervening
in equality of treatment questions that may arise from military actions.25
President Barak views the role of the Supreme Court as ensuring that the
military acts "within the framework of the 'zone of reasonableness"' in its
actions and measures, not as ruling on the efficiency of counterterrorism
efforts.26
Judicial review of executive actions pertaining to counter-terrorism
must not be delayed until the crisis passes. President Barak believes it is
imperative for the judiciary to ensure that executive actions comport with
principles of democracy. Accordingly, they must be evaluated in real time.
As Barak has said, "[t]he protection of human rights would be bankrupt if,
during armed conflict, the courts-consciously or unconsciously-decided
to review the executive branch's behavior only after the period of
emergency has ended., 27 If a court postpones reviewing executive actions
until the period of emergency or time of crisis has passed, then any ruling
issued by the court would not contribute to the rule of law. Rights must be
protected when the executive seeks to impinge upon them. Barak notes
that, "[j]udicial review of the legality of the war on terrorism may make
this war harder in the short term, but it also fortifies and strengthens the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 151.
25. Id. (discussing H.C. 168/91, Morcos v. Minister of Def., 45(1) P.D. 467, 470-71, in
which a citizen claimed that gas masks were handed out discriminatorily by a military
commander, Barak said that the Court addressed only the equality of the distribution of the
gas masks, not whether or not the masks should be distributed).
26. Id. at 157.
27. Id. at 156.
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people in the long term. 28
As will be discussed in section three of this article, President Barak's
theory is not an abstraction; rather, it reflects the activist approach adopted
by the High Court of Justice. Whether this approach will continue after
President Barak's retirement 29 is an issue beyond the scope of this article.
The intervention, what others would define as interference, of the High
Court of Justice will be examined by analyzing a number of seminal
decisions handed down over the past few years.
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist
Whereas President Barak strongly believes in the responsibility of the
Supreme Court to review actions of the executive in a timely fashion, the
late Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach was markedly different. Chief
Justice Rehnquist advocated a hands-off approach unlike President Barak's
very hands-on theory. In those rare instances where the judiciary does
review the legality of executive actions related to armed conflict, Chief
Justice Rehnquist believed the examination should wait until the time of
crisis has passed.
Chief Justice Rehnquist neither propounded inter arma silent leges (in
time of war laws are silent), nor did he believe that the law plays the same
role in war as in peace. Unlike President Barak, who forcefully argues that
the judiciary should interpret the laws in the same manner regardless of
whether it is a time of war, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the laws
"will speak with a somewhat different voice" during a time of war.30
Distinct from the direction taken by the Israeli Supreme Court under
President Barak's direction, the U.S. Supreme Court has never interpreted
laws equally during times of war and peace. Chief Justice Rehnquist points
out that the Supreme Court traditionally gave the executive branch more
leeway during war or crisis, particularly World War 11.31  Though
recognizing that "the government's authority to engage in conduct that
infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war,, 32 Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that not all executive actions should be reviewed by the
28. Id. at 158.
29. Mandatory retirement age for judges in Israel is 70, e.g.,
<elyon 1.court.gov.il/eng/judges/judges.html> (visited November 28, 2005); despite various
efforts by right-wing members of the Knesset to raise the age to 75, as a means to prevent
the appointment of Justice Dorit Benesh to the Presidency, Barak will retire in 2006.
30. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIvIL LIBERTIES IN WAR TIME
225 (Patricia Hass ed., Alfred Knopf, Inc. 1998).
31. Id. at221.
32. Id. at 218.
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judiciary, especially during a crisis.
Even if a court examines the actions of the executive, the timing of the
examination is critical. Courts have a general reluctance "to decide a case
against the government on an issue of national security during a war.,
33
While President Barak strongly believes an essential duty of the judiciary is
to interpret the law identically during war and peace, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued for recognition of "the human factor that inevitably
enters into even the most careful judicial decision., 34  Therefore, he
implied that postponing decisions until the crisis has passed may be the
best option. As an example, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, in which the Supreme Court voted to uphold civil liberties
after World War II ended.35 By waiting until the completion of World War
II to rule on Duncan, the Supreme Court was able to uphold civil liberties
on record. Similarly, the Supreme Court ruling that Japanese internment
was illegal came well after martial law had already ended and American
citizens were no longer living in internment camps. 36  Chief Justice
Rehnquist questioned whether it may "actually be desirable to avoid
decision on" civil liberties during a war or time of crisis.
37
The difference between the two approaches is palpable. President
Barak advocates and practices active judicial review; the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist's approach was a much more hesitant, deferential one. They
differ not only to the extent of judicial review for executive actions, but
also the timing for when the judiciary should review. The decisions of their
respective courts reflect their differing approaches.
Ill. Comparative Analysis of Theories
A. Israel Introduction
In developing a counterterrorism strategy, Israel's policy and decision
makers are confronted by a critical reality-the doors of the High Court of
Justice are literally and figuratively open twenty-four hours a day to hear
the petitions of aggrieved Palestinians, or those acting on their behalf.38 A
junior military commander intent on conducting a particular operation, a
33. Id. at 221.
34. Id. at 222.
35. Id. at 221 (citing Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)).
36. Id. (citing Ex Parte Misuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)).
37. Id. at 222.
38. See supra note 7, regarding the Supreme Court functioning as the High Court of
Justice.
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senior officer determined to order that an area be a closed military zone,
and a noncommissioned officer's decision not to allow someone to pass
through a roadblock are all "petitionable" to the Court as they occur. The
American standard of standing and justiciability are irrelevant; anyone may
petition the Court on behalf of a potentially aggrieved party.
To emphasize the diametric difference between the American and
Israeli systems, a petition filed against the Presidential Order establishing
military commissions39 would have, in all probability, been upheld in
Israel. Furthermore, Israeli human rights organizations would petition
against the alleged human rights abuses in Guantanamo 40 on a regular
basis. The Court would likely not only hear the petition, it would issue
restraining orders against the Government.
The principle of judicial activism in Israel will be examined by
analyzing two petitions filed with the High Court of Justice. The two cases
are representative and indicative of the interplay between the executive
(which in the West Bank is the IDF),4 1 the aggrieved (either a Palestinian
who directly petitions or a human rights group petitioning on his behalf),
and the Court.
These petitions were filed during the course of the past five years at
the height of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli counterterrorism.42  The
Court hearings are not taking place in a vacuum; while the Court
adjudicates, the IDF is either planning or engaged in military operations
against Palestinian terrorists who similarly are planning their next attack.43
The three decisions have been chosen because they represent three very
different issues that the Court chose to address.
39. Military commissions are separate from the ordinary court system. They are run by
the military and do not follow the principles of law and rules of evidence generally
recognized in criminal cases in U.S. federal district courts. For further discussion, see
section 111(b).
40. As will be discussed later in the article, Guantanamo Bay is where the United States
is detaining individuals to be tried by military commissions.
41. This is written post-disengagement from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the
West Bank. Prior to disengagement, the IDF was the executive for the Gaza Strip as well.
42. See Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 319 (2004) (an account of the conflict since October, 2000).
43. Id. at 326 (during April, 2002, at the peak of the IDF's "Ebb and Flow" military
operation against Palestinian terrorism in Jenin, 42 petitions were filed against the IDF on a
wide variety of humanitarian issues including the right of Palestinians to receive their
medication, the burial of dead Palestinian terrorists, water and food supplies to the civilian
population, house demolitions).
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B. United States Introduction
The history of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in wartime is not
distinguished." The Supreme Court under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
continued the historical deference given to executive actions in recent
terrorism related rulings. Even though the Supreme Court has recently held
against the executive in terrorism related cases, it showed continued
deference in the tone used in its opinions.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order
establishing military commissions for enemy combatants. 45  The U.S.
government chose Guantanamo Bay in Cuba as the site where detainees
would be held.46 Over the course of the next four months, three hundred
detainees were transported to Guantanamo Bay47 for purposes of
interrogation and hearings before the military commissions. According to
Section Four of the Military Order, a detainee convicted on any charge
could appeal only to the President of the United States or the Secretary of
Defense.48 The U.S. government thereby detained hundreds of detainees in
Guantanamo Bay49 while denying them independent judicial review of their
status and the danger-if any-they presented to the national security of
the United States. Whether the Supreme Court took notice of these
developments is unknown; what is clear is that the Court was a non-player
in one of the burning issues of the post-9/11 world, namely what legal
44. See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of
Japanese-American citizens by deferring to the knowledge and experience of the executive
as to what is right during a time of war).
45. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
46. See Jim Garamone, Secretary Defends Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, Am.
Forces Info. Serv., June 14, 2005 (Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld stated "The
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay was established for the simple reason that the United
States needed a safe and secure location to detain and interrogate enemy combatants.") at
<www.defenselink.mil/news/jun2005/20050614_1726.html> (visited Nov. 6, 2005).
47. Jim Garamone, Tension Eases at Guantanamo Holding Facility, Am. Forces Info.
Serv., Mar. 1, 2002, at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03012002_200203012.html>
(visited Nov. 6, 2005).
48. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 4(c)(8) (Nov. 16, 2001) ("submission of the record of the
trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by [the President]
or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for that purpose"); See also § 7(b)(2)
("the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding,
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's
behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any
foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.").
49. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
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paradigm would be applied to terrorists. 50  Although the U.S. Supreme
Court does not function as a High Court of Justice (unlike the Israeli
Supreme Court),5' the question is whether Chief Justice Rehnquist's
philosophy allowed the Administration to know that they could "get away
with it."52 When the Chief Justice writes "there remains a sense that there
is some truth to the maxim inter arma silent leges at least in the purely
descriptive sense,, 53 does the Administration assume that the Court will, if
it hears a case on a related matter, issue a ruling in line with the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist's philosophy?
If the Israeli model represents one end of the spectrum of judicial
activism and the Rehnquist position the other, then it is arguable that the
violations of basic detainee rights in Guantanamo Bay were a natural result
of judicial acquiescence. The question to be discussed is whether
Guantanamo Bay was yet another example of an unfettered executive
erring in policy, assisted unwittingly by a judicial philosophy of inter arma
silent leges.
C. Detainees
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Israeli Supreme Court have both
addressed the issue of executive ordered detentions. Both Courts have held
the executive detentions problematic, but they have done so using
dramatically different methods.
1. Marab v. 1DF Commander in the West Bank
With the advent of operation "Ebb and Flow," 54 the IDF arrested
50. One of the critical issues confronting decision makers, policy makers, and jurists
alike is what paradigm should be applied to terrorists; are they to be granted full POW
rights, are they to be treated as criminals, or is there a need to develop a third paradigm that
is based on the first two?
51. See supra note 7, regarding the Israeli Supreme Court functioning as the High Court
of Justice.
52. According to confidential sources, President Barak implored the Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, in particular Chief Justice Rehnquist, to adopt a philosophy of judicial
activism. According to these reports, Barak argued that judicial acquiescence in
misbegotten executive decisions is more harmful than problematic legislation for legislation
can be more easily repealed than the Court would reverse itself.
53. REHNQUiST, supra note 32, at 221.
54. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statements by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and
Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer at Press Conference (Mar. 29, 2002), at
<www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2002/Statements+by+P
M+Sharon+and+DM+Ben-Eliezer+at+pres.htm> (visited Nov. 28, 2005). After the
Passover eve massacre at the Park Hotel in Netanya the IDF undertook a massive operation
into the West Bank in order to break up terrorist infrastructures. The operation which
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thousands of Palestinians suspected of involvement in terrorism. It was a
response to a particularly heinous act of terrorism that resulted in the deaths
of thirty Israelis, many of them elderly, who had come to celebrate the
Passover meal together. 5 As the military operation had not been planned
thoroughly in advance, critical non-combat issues were literally resolved
"on the fly." As a result, a wide variety of important issues had not been
considered and the issues were left to individual initiative.
5 6
One of the issues that had not been properly planned was where to
detain the thousands of Palestinians who were being arrested daily. As the
detention process developed, the initial screening of detainees was
conducted at brigade headquarters; 57 a process which required a significant
amount of time, in sometimes questionable conditions.
According to Military Order 378, as amended in 1997, a Palestinian
may be held for eight days before seeing a judge. 58 When the IDF realized
that the number of detainees who needed to be processed would require a
violation of the order, the military commander signed Order 1500 to extend
included mass calls up of reserve units (the response was reported as 100%) was the largest
such IDF operation in years.
55. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Passover Suicide Bombing at Park Hotel in
Netanya, Mar. 27, 2002, at
<www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/3/Passover/o20suicide%20bombing
%20at%2OPark%2OHotel%20in%2ONetanya> (visited Oct. 31, 2005).
56. As an example, this writer was serving as the Commander of the IDF School of
Military Law ("SML"); based on a number of hurried phone calls and, at the initiative of a
few commanders, the officers of the SML lectured literally around the clock to reserve and
obligatory service units alike as they were being deployed into the West Bank on an eleven
point code of conduct concerning their conduct vis-A-vis the Palestinian civilian population.
This code, based on international law, Israeli law, and the IDF ethical code was later taught
via an interactive video developed by the School's officers. This writer was appointed by
the Judge Advocate General to be responsible for the JAG's lessons learned and to draft a
report that would be the basis for significant internal changes, including the preparation of
the "JAG in the box" approach developed by the U.S. Air Force JAG.
57. The military commander of the West Bank is a Brigadier General (in the United
States, a one-star) who commands a division. The West Bank is divided by the IDF into a
number of brigades, under the command of a colonel.
58. In Israel, according to section 9.3.3 of the Penal Code, a detainee must be brought
before a judge within 24 hours. Leslie Sebba, et al., European Institute for Crime
Prevention and Control Affiliated with the United Nations, Israel, Criminal Justice Systems
in Europe and North America, (2003) available at
<www.heuni.fi/uploads/j6hs3o3ru64zn5.pdf>. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip have
never been annexed to the State of Israel which is why the government is a military
government; in addition, the laws of the State do not apply to the two areas. The legislation
of the areas is drafted by the officers of the Judge Advocate General Corps and signed into
being by the Commander of the Central Command or by the Commander of the Southern
Command (both are Major Generals; the equivalent to two-star generals).
2005]
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the period of time. 59 As a result of this Order, detainees could be held up to
eighteen days without seeing a military judge.6 °
A petition was filed against this Order by lad Ashak Mahmud Marab,
a detainee.6' In the petition and oral arguments, counsel argued that the
Order leads to collective detention without judicial review and to prolonged
mass detention rather than individual review. Counsel therefore argued the
Order was neither preventive nor administrative and violated the principles
of proportionality and due process.62
The State responded to the petition by arguing that the standard
detention law was not suitable for combat situations and the screening of
detainees is a time-consuming process. The State argued that keeping
detainees from meeting with counsel prevents the passing of messages that
endanger soldiers. The State also argued that the detentions were
individualized rather than collective, and that they were unique in the
context of special circumstances of armed conflict. The State asserted that
the standards were proportional and reasonable.63
In ruling that the Order was illegal, the Court made a number of
arguments. The Court ruled that holding individuals for twelve or eighteen
days without bringing them before a judge conflicted with "fundamentals
of both international and Israeli law." 64 The Court also held that judicial
review is not separate from detention but rather is "an integral part of the
detention process" and as such cannot legally be separated.65 The Court's
insistence that judicial review is integral to executive detentions reflects
President Barak's belief that the judiciary can and must review executive
actions.
The Court's decision addressed a number of important dilemmas as
they were unfolding, that were highly relevant to the rule of law during
armed conflict.
59. Special order: Detention in Time of Warfare (Temporary Order) (Judean and
Samaria) (Number 1500)-2002).
60. Palestinians are brought to trial before the Military Court of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip; the judges are career officers in the Military Court unit or lawyers in reserve
duty. The prosecutors are officers in the Judge Advocate General Corps. The defense
attorneys are civilians (unlike in Guantanamo where detainees are represented by attorneys
from the service JAG's).
61. H.C. 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, (2002), available at
<elyonl .court.gov.il/fileseng/02/390/032/a04/02032390.a04.pdf>.
62. Id. at 8-10.
63. Id. at 11-14.
64. Id. at 32.
65. Id.
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2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Hamdi was an American citizen captured in Afghanistan during the
66American military campaign. Hamdi was initially placed in detention in
Afghanistan and then transferred to Guantanamo Bay. When the United
States learned that Hamdi may not have renounced his American
citizenship, he was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig.67 A
petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on his behalf, challenging the
legality of the Government's decision to detain him on U.S. soil as an
enemy combatant. 68 Furthermore, Hamdi demanded that he be provided
the opportunity to challenge the government's decision to so define him.69
The majority opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, written by Justice
O'Connor, reviews both international law and constitutional dilemmas.7 °
In examining whether the Supreme Court will limit the executive's power,
Justice O'Connor's analysis highlights the significantly different
approaches of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Israeli Supreme Court, even
when similar conclusions are reached. Justice O'Connor writes that the
Constitution "assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake., 71  The real issue, of course, is the
particular role of the judiciary: when and how should the judiciary be
involved?
In Hamdi, the government argued for strong separation of powers in
which the judiciary would have very limited ability to review executive
actions.72 Furthermore, if the judiciary did review the executive, it must
employ a very deferential standard of review. 73  The government's
arguments reflected the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that the
Supreme Court should interpret laws differently in times of war and in
times of peace.
Justice O'Connor's opinion highlights the tension between national
security considerations and individual civil rights. In balancing the
government's and the petitioner's concerns, the judiciary weighs "'the
private interest that will be affected by the official action' against the





70. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507 (2004).
71. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650.
72. Id. at 2645.
73. Id.
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government's asserted interest, 'including the function involved' and the
burdens the government would face in providing greater process. '74 Justice
O'Connor's opinion analyzes, step by step, the balancing between national
security and "the most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in being
free from physical detention by one's own government.
' 75
Unlike President Barak's uncompromising and unapologetic opinions,
Justice O'Connor's opinion is diplomatic and tentative. Though the Court
limits executive action, Justice O'Connor apologetically details the reasons
for ruling in favor of Hamdi, even as she pays respect to the government's
arguments and position. Justice O'Connor carefully tries not to diminish
the role of the executive branch or discount the executive's national
security interests by clearly stating that the government's interest is
critical.76 Justice O'Connor's opinion never explicitly says that the
executive is wrong, even as it states that "an unchecked system of detention
carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others
who do not present" an immediate national security threat. Rather, the
opinion frames the issue as the executive misbalanced between national
security and individual liberties.
While Justice O'Connor states that it is of "great importance ' 77 to
strike a proper constitutional balance, she never explicitly details that it is
the judiciary's duty to make sure that the balance is proper. She states that
the court's current analysis of whether balance was achieved must give due
weight to concerns of national security and civil liberties, but does not
explicitly state, as President Barak would, that the court has a duty to check
the actions of the executive. Justice O'Connor argues that "we must
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad" without saying exactly what role the courts and the judiciary
should play in making sure that commitment is indeed preserved.78
Compared to Justice O'Connor's language in Hamdi, President Barak in
Marab unequivocally addresses the Court's importance and obligation to
ensure the rights of detainees.
Justice O'Connor's opinion also compromises with the executive in a
manner that President Barak, as indicated in his writings, would not. While
President Barak strongly believes that the Court should analyze the
74. Id. at 2646.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2647.
77. Id. at 2648.
78. Id. Justice O'Connor does state the courts have a "time-honored and constitutionally
mandated" role in "reviewing and resolving claims like those presented." Id. at 2649-2650.
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executive in the same manner during a time of crisis as it would in a time
of peace, Justice O'Connor reflects the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's idea
that the Court should give more deference to the executive in a time of
crisis. She writes that "the Constitution would not be offended by a
presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that
presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal
were provided., 79 President Barak's writing clearly supports a belief that
the Constitution would and should be offended by a presumption in favor
of the executive. President Barak's belief that the judiciary is a guardian of
democracy would not comport with Justice O'Connor's rebuttable
presumption compromise. Even though the presumption is rebuttable,
President Barak's belief would be unlikely to allow any sort of presumption
on behalf of the executive.
Justice O'Connor's opinion, while reaching the conclusion that the
Supreme Court may indeed engage in judicial activism, does so in a
manner that could be described as apologetic or deferential. Unlike the
Israeli High Court of Justice, which literally assumes that it may intervene
in the decisions of the military commander, Hamdi suggests that the U.S.
Supreme Court is extremely uncomfortable in this matter. The Rehnquist
Court in Hamdi debated whether or not the Court had the power to review
the detentions. Barak's Court refuses to entertain the idea that they would
not have the right. Though the majority in Hamdi held that the actions of
the executive are indeed subject to judicial review, the style and manner
very much suggest otherwise. The philosophical approach advocated by
the late Chief Justice Rehnquist is very apparent in the opinion's language,
although the result is arguably different from what Chief Justice
Rehnquist's writings suggest. He dissented in Hamdi, but did not write a
separate opinion.
D. Timeliness of the Court's Action
1. Physicians for Human Rights et al. v. Commander of the IDF
Forces in the Gaza Strip
80
The second issue to be analyzed is an example of the Israeli Supreme
Court's immediate response to petitions filed during combat regarding the
IDF's responsibility to honor international humanitarian law obligations.
79. Id. at 2649.
80. H.C. 4764/04, Physicians for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF
Forces in the Gaza Strip, (2004), available at
<elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.pdf >.
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In response to widespread smuggling of arms and ammunition through an
intricate series of tunnels dug between Egypt and the city of Rafah (located
in the southern part of the Gaza Strip), the IDF conducted a military
operation intended to locate and destroy the tunnels and to weaken the
terrorist infrastructure in Rafah.
During the course of the fighting, civilians were injured and the water
supply was affected. Complaints were lodged that the IDF was not
allowing basic supplies, such as medication, to enter the city.
A petition was filed by Physicians for Human Rights, Association for
Civil Rights in Israel, the Center for the Defense of the Individual, and
B'Tselem, asking the Court to order the IDF to enable critical humanitarian
supplies to be received by the local population and to ensure that the water
supply was adequate.8 1 Similar to Marab, the Court heard the case during
the course of the armed conflict. Furthermore, it is important to note that a
senior IDF Commander was present in the courtroom so as to be able to
respond directly to the Court's questions.
The petition was filed on a Thursday and the hearing was held the
following day. An additional question presented-whether the Court
should directly intervene in IDF combat operations while IDF soldiers are
at risk-must be weighed against the danger to a civilian population
similarly at risk.
In response, the State argued that the Court should exercise judicial
restraint. The State declared that the operation's goals were to prevent
additional arms smuggling and to break up the terrorist infrastructure.82
The State also argued that humanitarian measures were taking place within
the confines of a military operation and that the IDF was attempting to
minimize danger to innocent civilians while Palestinian terrorists were
using civilians as "human shields."
83
How did the Court review these issues in the context of combat while
attempting to balance between national security and individual rights? The
Court stated that it would not rule on the manner in which combat is
conducted, as that is the responsibility of military commanders when
"soldiers' lives are in danger."84 The decision of whether or not to take
military action is not a judicial question. Rather, the judicial question is
whether the operation meets international humanitarian legal obligations.
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 22.
84. Id. at 16.
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The Court assumed that the operations are a military necessity.
85
In granting a majority of the petitioners' requests, the Court held that
rules of conduct must be taught to and internalized by all combat soldiers,
regardless of their rank.86 The Court also required that "procedures be
drawn up that allow implementation of these rules, and which allow them
to be put into practice during combat., 87 The Court confirms that the
military commander has a duty to prevent his troops from "harming lives
and dignity of the local residents. 88
In this case, the Court demonstrates not only its willingness to review
executive actions but also the importance of timing. Unlike the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist's doubt as to whether a court should necessarily hear a
case while the emergency is ongoing, Physicians for Human Rights
demonstrates Barak's view that contemporaneous review is imperative.
Timing was literally a matter of life and death in this case, as the water
supply and humanitarian supplies were crucial to the survival of those
living in Rafah.
Barak's decision that the case be heard and supplies be allowed into
Rafah while IDF soldiers were still involved in combat upholds his belief
that laws should be applied equally in times of war and peace. In contrast
to the Rehnquist Court's hesitation and deference, Barak unhesitatingly
required that supplies be brought into the city, even though the crisis was
ongoing and soldiers' lives were at risk.
2. Rasul v. Bush
In Shafiq Rasul et al. v. George Bush,89 the Court was asked to
address, "whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured
abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base, Cuba."90 Petitioners were two Australians and twelve
Kuwaitis who had been captured in Afghanistan during hostilities with the
Taliban and held in military custody at Guantanamo Bay.91
Justice Stevens, writing the majority opinion, stated that "[w]hat is
presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to
85. Id. at 17.
86. Id. at 66.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2686.
90. Id. at 2690.
91. Id.
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determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of
individuals . ,92 The very narrow question that the Court addresses
demonstrates deference to the executive. Such an approach enabled the
Rehnquist Court to rule against the executive without limiting executive
actions as much as the HCJ limits the Israeli executive. Even though the
Court ultimately held against the executive in Rasul, it did so in a narrow
manner.
Justice Stevens' opinion starts with a brief description of the
September 11 th attacks on the United States. 93 By including details about
the attacks and the damage caused by them, Justice Stevens subtly
acknowledges the national security concerns of the executive. Unlike
Justice O'Connor's direct acknowledgement of the concerns and arguments
of the executive, Justice Stevens only implies the strength of the
executive's argument, stating that the President acted pursuant to
Congressional authorization.94
Justice Stevens explicitly states that the federal judiciary does indeed
have the jurisdiction to decide the legality of executive actions. He neither
states it apologetically nor does he place emphasis on the government's
arguments. Unlike Justice O'Connor, who repeatedly emphasized the
executive's legitimate concerns, Justice Stevens focuses on why the
judiciary has jurisdiction without giving undue credence to the arguments
of the government. Justice Stevens' opinion shows more deference to the
executive than President Barak would have, and yet much less deference
than Justice O'Connor did in Hamdi. The tone of Justice Stevens' opinion
shows that the Court seems to have started moving away from strict
adherence to Chief Justice Rehnquist's views. However, the timing of
Rasul conforms with the late Chief Justice's views on when judicial review
should occur.
As discussed earlier, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned whether it
may "actually be desirable to avoid decision on" civil liberties cases during
a war or time of crisis, precisely because he believed courts were more
likely to rule favorably on civil liberty issues after the war is over.95
Perhaps most indicative of Rehnquist's views are the cases that are not
brought before the Court. Out of the hundreds of detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, very few cases have reached the Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist "believed that the court should reserve its time and effort
92. Id. at 2699.
93. Id. at 2690.
94. Id.
95. REHNQUIST, supra note 30, at 222.
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for cases of national importance that absolutely require its attention."
96
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard Guantanamo Bay
cases, such as Rasul, three years after the military commissions were
implemented, the HCJ heard Marab while the IDF was continuing to
detain Palestinian terrorists and heard Physicians for Human Rights while
the conflict was ongoing. Therefore, solutions needed to be developed
and implemented while the Court heard arguments. The U.S. Supreme
Court, as illustrated through both Rasul and Hamdi, demonstrates the
seeming unwillingness of the Court to respond contemporaneously, and
directly reflects Chief Justice Rehnquist's idea that some cases should not
be heard during the time of crisis. Decisions of the Court in response to
ongoing counterterrorism actions by the executive are the essence of
judicial activism.
IV. Conclusion
As described above, President Barak and the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist had very different views on judicial review of executive actions
and these views were reflected in the opinions of their Courts. Even
though they may have agreed on some of the outcomes in the above cases,
President Barak and Chief Justice Rehnquist had different means of
reaching those ends. It will be most interesting to see what directions the
Israeli Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court take in the future. Within
the next year, both Courts will be under new leadership. The key question
for both Courts is whether they will adhere to the theories of their former
leaders or whether changes and adjustments will be made. The U.S.
Supreme Court has already begun this process as a new Chief Justice, John
Roberts, has been confirmed. It is unknown at this time what this will
mean for the U.S. Supreme Court's continued deference to the executive on
issues of national security-will the Court continue as when Rehnquist was
the Chief Justice or will Chief Justice Roberts assume a role more similar
to that of President Barak? President Barak himself will retire next year
and the Israeli Supreme Court will then face a similar question-will the
Israel Supreme Court continue to be as willing to review executive actions
regarding armed conflict as they occur? The issue of judicial review on
issues regarding armed conflict, whether review should exist and when it
should take place, will thus have to be addressed by the new leadership of
each court.
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